Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015)
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 6

1988

Wombs for Rent, Selves for Sale?
David H. Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp

Recommended Citation
David H. Smith, Wombs for Rent, Selves for Sale?, 4 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 23 (1988).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol4/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

WOMBS FOR RENT, SELVES FOR SALE?*
David H. Smith*
In this paper I want to offer some preliminary reflections on the highly
controversial practice of surrogating, the bearing of a child for another, often
for a fee. The practice was the core of the widely publicized "Baby M" trial
in New Jersey; it will continue to attract the attention of legislators and
courts; it has been the subject of legislation in the United Kingdom and
elsewhere; the Holy See has released pertinent judgments. Many of the
most interesting minds of our culture have commented on it. Few persons
are neutral on the subject.
Although I have some conclusions to offer, the tone I should like to attain
is interrogative rather than assertive. Ultimately my conviction is that we
can move too quickly to pronounce on the morality of practices made possible by new technologies for reproduction. It is unlikely that any one philosophy or theology will be able to provide a definitive resolution to these
problems. The brave new world is too new; among the virtues it most requires is patience.
My strategy will be to discuss a series of perspectives on surrogating, extracting what we can from each in turn. The perspectives are analogies.
Much moral reasoning proceeds by analogy, e.g., stealing real property is
wrong, so stealing ideas-intellectual property-is wrong; killing people in
war is acceptable, so capital punishment must be all right. I doubt I need to
illustrate further.
Reasoning by analogy is particularly important when we face a new issue,,
for the moral imagination needs to start from somewhere. We need a more
or less fixed point from which we can extrapolate our conclusions. I suppose
the process is a bit like that of reasoning from precedent in the common law.
There, as here, a great deal turns on what is judged to be relevant precedent.
* This article was originally given as the Brendan Brown Lecture at The Columbus
School of Law, Catholic University of America, on March 26, 1987. I am most grateful to
Professor George P. Smith II, Dean Ralph J. Rohner, and many faculty members for
trenchant feedback that has greatly improved the final text. In addition I have received most
helpful comments from Richard Miller, Joseph Rautenberg and Henry B. Veatch. The usual
disclaimers apply; the urgency of saying thank you is unusually strong.
** B.A., Carlton College, B.D., Yale Divinity School, Ph.D. in theology, Princeton University, Professor of Religious Studies and Director of Poynter Center for the Study of Ethics
in American Institutions, Indiana University.
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My concern today is not primarily with the law; it is with those habits of the
heart that should inform our social judgments and reflections. If my analysis is correct on this moral level, it may have implications for law and policy,
but that is my end rather than my beginning.
Before I turn to the analogies I wish to discuss, I must add one more
caveat. I do not mean to speak about all issues that the practice of surrogating may raise. In particular I put aside issues associated with risks to the
embryo and its putative right to life. I do not suggest that these issues are
unimportant, but one can only attempt so much at a time. Therefore, I shall
proceed on the assumption that any techniques of in vitro fertilization and
embryo transfer that may be involved in surrogating are as safe for embryos
as normal conception. My focus will not be on risks to the embryo but on
risks to the parents.
II
The first analogy to surrogating that comes to mind is Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID). The practice of using donated semen to impregnate
the fertile wife of an infertile husband is not itself uncontroversial, but it is
widely practiced and accepted. In this country, semen donors may be paid.
Their anonymity is preserved, although they may be screened for possible
genetic problems. The technology required is simple, and the practice is not
particularly new.'
The positive analogy with surrogating seems clear; in both cases a child is
engendered who has, in a sense, more than two parents. But with surrogating the possible variations are greater, for the surrogate may or may not
be the donor of the ovum. If she is not-that is, if an in vitro fertilization of
husband and wife's gametes precedes implantation in the surrogate-then
the disanalogy is maximized. But in the more likely event that the husband's
semen is used to impregnate the surrogate and her own egg is fertilized in
vivo (as in the well-publicized Baby M case), then the analogy is closer. (Of
course, the closest analogy would be with an egg donation and fertilization
of a wife in vivo.)
Those who stress the analogy mean to call our attention to the use of a
donated gamete. Then we are asked to pronounce on this use of sperm or
egg from a third party beyond the married partners. The English theologian
1. See generally, Smith, ProcreationalAutonomy v. State Intervention: Opportunity or
Crisisfor a Brave New World?, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. .ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 635 (1986); Smith,
The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: ArtificialFathers and Surrogate Mothers, 5 NEw ENG.

L. REV. 639 (1982).
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Oliver O'Donovan has developed this point with considerable force. One
way to see his subtle point is to focus on the notion of donor anonymity.
O'Donovan notices that clinics doing AID place great emphasis on the
anonymity of a sperm donor. This approach contrasts with the roughly
analogous practices recorded in the Old Testament. One of those practices
was levirate marriage in which a dead man's brother impregnated the
widow to engender a child who would be counted as the heir of the deceased. 2 [Onan defaulted on this responsibility]. The other practice is patriarchal-a servant bears a child when a barren wife cannot, as Hagar bore a
child when Sarah could not. 3 In neither of these cases is the donor anonymous. Quite the contrary, it is the prior relationship between donor and
couple that validates the whole procedure. The Biblical texts represent a
sensibility very different from ours.
Which is the better way? To focus our thinking on this issue we can ask:
Is sperm, egg or womb donation between siblings the ideal or the worst possible arrangement? In terms of the donors motivation, we may feel that it is
optimal-I know how much my brother wants the child he cannot have, and
I give of myself to make paternity possible for him. It's arguable that this
inter-familial context is the one in which altruism, spontaneity and generosity on the part of the donor will be maximized. If those are our worries, we
should choose this arrangement.
But in fact I am ambivalent about this option. In part, my reservation is
due to memory. Everyone will remember who was pregnant or notice that
Junior looks like his uncle. The events of gestation will not be a "sometime
thing" but, through memory and representation, an ongoing part of the present. Within the familial context it would be obvious that procreating a child
establishes a real connection, even if the subsequent social arrangements
minimize the significance of that fact. It would be clear that I am inevitably
linked with the children I engender.
The whole point of the stress on donor anonymity is to minimize the tie of
biological lineage as much as possible. It is to reduce to a bare minimum the
personal involvement of the donor, who becomes a kind of deus absconditus.
O'Donovan suggests that we might think of the donor as a representative of
the sterile spouse, but in our modern stress on anonymity it is what he calls
"representation by effacement", 4 signifying that the donor who acts vicariously for the sterile party is clearly subordinated to the sterile parent. Hagar
2. Deuteronomy 25:6.
3. Genesis 30:3.
4. 0. O'DONOVAN, BEGOTTEN OR MADE?, p. 34 (1984).

26

Journalof Contemporary Health Law and Policy

[Vol. 4:23

and a modem gamete donor are people who do the bidding of a superior. Is
this a role that can be played with dignity?
O'Donovan argues that it is not; he suggests that in order to "overcome
the depersonalizing implications of anonymity ... and the intrusiveness of
the alien personality" we might seek ways-in the case of AID-of developing "a strong doctrine of male-to-male identification, through the notion of a
contractual relationship between donor and husband."
This approach
builds on the Biblical precedent of levirate marriage in which the donor, so
to speak, plays from strength. O'Donovan calls it "representation by replacement." '6 Its presupposition is a notion of community between the fertile
and the sterile. The idea is that a sperm donation is morally more credible if
it is a gift from the donor to the infertile man. Donations of ovum and
uterus are most favorably seen as expressions of sisterhood. It is not clear
how these ideas could be implemented in policy, but they are suggestive.
So far I have been attempting to focus on the positive analogy between
AID and surrogating, but it must be clear that we have-perhaps long
since-reached the point where the analogy breaks down. That point is
pregnancy. Both males and females can donate gametes; males cannot become pregnant. Pregnancy is, so to speak, an extended event. An involvement of nine months duration, inevitably characterized by interactions
between animate beings, differs qualitatively from masturbation and donation of the ejaculate. This is not to say that semen donation never means
anything to the donor; I have tried to suggest a normative thesis to the
contrary. Rather, it is to say that there is an obvious disanalogy between a
surrogate mother and a sperm donor.
If donor anonymity is problematic for a gamete donor, how should things
stand with the surrogate? Should surrogate mothers be anonymous? Does
the disanalogy weaken or strengthen the ambiguous case for third party anonymity? One way to look at this question is to inquire about the degree of
involvement in various kinds of "mothering". Would it be right to say that
the woman who contributes an egg is less involved with an engendered child
than the woman who bears it? I leave this question open, as it need not be
raised in the usual form of surrogating, in which the same woman donates
both egg and uterus.
Presuming that her involvement is greater than that of the semen donor,
does that strengthen or weaken the case for anonymity? On the one hand it
would seem to strengthen her claim to have her presence acknowledged and
to play a role in the child's life; on the other hand, this threat to the exclu5. Id. at 41.
6. Id. at 34.
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siveness of monogamy must be intolerable to the infertile couple and it may
well lead to complications in the child's life. My preliminary conclusion
from reflections on our first analogy is that a surrogate has a strong claim for
involvement in the life of a child she bears because the bond established by
pregnancy is at least as significant as the bond established by genetic continuity. I do not claim to have shown that a surrogate should have exclusive
rights, only that her involvement is distinctive and significant and that it
engenders plausible claims that are more powerful than those associated
with simple biological paternity.
III
O'Donovan relates his discussion of AID to adoption, and in fact adoption may provide another analogy to surrogating. In both cases a woman
bears a child whom she gives over to another. We recognize that this act
may be a particularly mature and generous choice on the part of a woman
who gives her child for adoption. And it is important to see that the motives
of a surrogate may be comparably generous and loving. No one can deny
that surrogating may be a loving act, creative of human community and
sacrificially empowering. Indeed, the very strength of the bond that can be
fostered in pregnancy increases the degree to which a surrogate may be giving of herself, laying down her life, for another. Supported as it is by the
words of Jesus, this is a hard idea for Christian theologians, and many
others, to oppose. Insofar as surrogating is like adoption, it too may be a just
and loving act.
But two disanalogies must be mentioned. The first concerns equality. The
adoption that is often analogized with surrogating does not involve one
spouse adopting children from the other spouse's previous marriage.
Rather, the adopted children are the children of neither of the adoptive parents. Each partner in the adopting couple has the same kind of relationship
to the child they adopt.
Surrogating, in contrast, establishes an unequal relation- the engendered
child is the biological child of one parent, but not of the other. Given the
maneuvers that are part of any marriage, I find this imbalance troubling, for
it provides a purchase point for power plays at the core of the marriage. The
question that must be raised is-why must the husband have whatever benefits of genetic parenthood there may be? Why insist on this good, which his
wife cannot share? Can his genetic patrimony be all that important?
This inequality would also exist when a spouse adopts children from the
other spouse's previous marriage, but then we have a disanalogy of cause. In
surrogating a woman becomes pregnant in order to give up the child. This
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intention is not the case in adoption as we normally think of it. If a woman
were to sell children she had engendered with her husband, we would regard
her action as radically different from the forms of adoption with which we
are familiar. We would think that it revealed an unfortunate attitude toward
the child, whose conception had become a means to an end. We would find
the woman's attitude toward her own body troubling. And we would worry
about the social circumstances that put persons in such a position that they
resorted to this means of support.
We will see that surrogating raises these kinds of issues as they would be
raised with the bizarre form of adoption practice that I have described. Of
course we can imagine exceptions in the adoption situation. There may be
times when a woman might become pregnant in order to give some other
specific person (e.g., a sterile sister) a child. However, this course would be
exceptional, and it is made palatable as an act to provide a child for an
identified sterile couple. A plausible situation might be one in which the
bearing mother knows and loves the adoptive parents. But that is not modem surrogating.
Adoption differs from surrogating in that the first motive in the mind of
the mother is the welfare of her child. Her primary intention is to provide
for the child, not to help another couple. Thus, as O'Donovan rightly remarks, an adequate theory of adoption must see that it is the adoptive parents who are doing a favor, representing or acting on behalf of the biological
ones.' Adoption is morally credible precisely in its difference from surrogating. Like giving up a child for adoption, surrogating can be a magnanimous act. But as we push the analogy the disanalogies become more
prominent, and surrogating looks problematic by comparison.
IV
At our next level I should like to cluster three analogies that are not always used together. One of these is an analogy with prostitution. Both a
prostitute and a surrogate make their bodies available for the use of another.
Both are paid a fee. Neither expects the creation of a personal bond with the
client; both may bring pleasure into the lives of others. In either case these
expectations may not be realized. A bond may form; VD may be contracted;
a child may be impaired; the payment may be withheld.
A second analogy in this cluster is the sale of organs, a subject of renewed
debate today. Blood and blood products are, in this country, bought and
sold in a market; we have only a limited market for other kinds of human
tissue, e.g., kidneys. If we accept the idea of the sale or donation of some
7. Id. at 37.
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kinds of human tissue, gamete donation may not appear radically different
from selling blood or kidneys. In a next step, we could say that a surrogate
is simply hiring out her body, not permanently giving up a part of it as a
kidney donor would. Surrogating is like organ donation in that it is giving
someone else use of part of your body.
And, thirdly, we allow people to decide how they choose to use their bodies in other contexts. Dangerous sports (boxing) and leisure activities
(smoking) are not prohibited. Surrogating is like those kinds of activities in
that it involves a person's right to use her own body as she sees fit.
I have grouped these analogies because they have a common ingredient.
Each of them suggests that the fundamental issue in surrogating is the question of women's rights. This claim is true even for the prostitution analogy,
a fact that may be hidden by a rhetorical maneuver appealing to our traditional opposition to prostitution. Of course, surrogating differs from prostitution in that sexual intercourse is not involved, but I believe the greatest
modem opposition to prostitution arises from the fact that the prostitute
may have been coerced into her social role. Insofar as she has freely chosen
her career, the user of this analogy may not mean to fault her.
These analogies, then, raise the question of the appropriate limits of the
jurisdiction that people have over their own lives. Stated differently, they
raise questions of paternalism. Who am I to say that someone should not
sell her favors, his kidney or the use of her uterus? In a culture that respects
autonomy, such restrictions make one person subservient to another's conception of the good; they impose someone else's conception of the good life
on me without my consent. When we cannot agree on the merits of a practice, we should have the courage to be tolerant.
This kind of argument was advanced in the Baby M case.' Gary Skoloff,
the Sterns' (pro-surrogating) lawyer, argued that to invalidate the contract
would deprive the surrogate of her dignity by limiting her control over her
own body. Addressing the male judge, he argued that ifyou prevent women from becoming surrogate mothers and deny
them the freedom to decide... you are saying that they do not have

the ability to make their own decisions, but you [emphasis added]
do. It's being unfairly paternalistic and it's an insult to the female
8. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
On February 4, 1988, the New Jersey Supreme Court voided the surrogate contract as well as
the termination of the surrogate mother's parental rights and the adoption of the child by the
doner's wife. The court acknowledged that a woman may still, voluntarily, and without pay-

ment, agree to act as a surrogate so long as she is not subject to a binding agreement to surrender her child upon its birth. 14 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2007 (1988).
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population of this nation.9
Ellen Goodman, from whose fine column I have taken this quotation, interprets it to mean that:
...any bona fide adult, over 18, able to read the fine print, is
grownup enough to take responsibility for his or her own action.
Signing up for maternity [is] like registering for the Marines. Anybody who said that such a contract should be prohibited was a relic
from an era when women were prohibited from all sorts of economic activities.' 0
On this point, Goodman commented:
Maybe I have a rather tough hide but, somehow or other, I won't
be insulted if the court limits the business arrangements women
can make with their genes and their wombs."
The general force of the anti-paternalistic analogies to prostitution, property and lifestyle is libertarian. And there is a progression. People should be
able to choose their own spouse or line of work; they should be free to adopt
their own lifestyle, however self-destructive it may be; they should be free to
sell their body parts, and therefore they should be free to hire out their
uteruses. This progression of argument is difficult to resist, if one's only
basic moral principle is respect for human autonomy. There can be no denying that increased control over reproduction gives women greater freedom,
freedom that they should have.
In order to test the depth of this analogical perspective, we need to distinguish between two possible ways of thinking about a woman's relationship to
a child she bears and indeed to her own reproductive processes. In one of
these perspectives the relationship between self and reproductive involvement is extrinsic and contingent. Pregnancy is viewed externally and objectively as a temporary state one is in for any one of a number of reasons. The
self calculates its reasons for pregnancy, mode and form of personal involvement. People of both genders regularly use this detached perspective to consider bodily events. It is not only a possible but a necessary perspective,
enabling self-criticism and self-discipline.
Another perspective on body is also possible: I identify myself with my
body. I not only control it, but I have to listen to it. This self that is not
simply instrumental to my plans is in some ways alien - but an alien
brother telling me that it's time for coffee or breakfast, that another is attractive, or that I like someone for reasons I don't understand. I have embodied
9. Goodman, Baby M: The Right to Give Away Your Rights?, Wash. Post, March 24,
1987, at A12, col. 1.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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involvements with others, involvements that are constitutive of me as a self.
These constitutive, involving embodiments are clearest in our relations with
our parents and our children. My daughter and son, father and mother, are
essentially and intrinsically involved with my selfhood.
The credibility of the libertarian analogies hinges on adoption of the first
and extrinsic perspective on reproduction. It tends to suggest thinking of my
body as property that I can alienate by contract; limitations on that right of
contract are limitations on the essential me. We can apply the analogy
handily with respect to the sale of tissue, especially regenerating tissue like
blood. We would not object if for some bizarre reason a person were to
profit from the sale of his feces or nail trimmings - why, then, should we
scruple over the sale of his blood?
Pausing only to note that a human byproduct is distinguishable from a
(fluid) part of the human body, I want to stress that a decision to become a
surrogate is significantly different from a decision to donate blood or even to
sell a kidney. And the reason is that it is impossible to be a surrogate at a
distance or anonymously. By definition, the body of a surrogate and the life
of a child are intertwined for thirty-eight weeks, more or less. Time and
propinquity are relevant variables.
I decline any support this observation might receive from strong theories
of fetal personhood. Nor do I mean to appeal to a mystical maternal instinct. I could make much the same point with reference to 4-H kids and
livestock, or a researcher and a mouse tested over several months. Interactive engagement over time tends to lead to personal involvement. Not in
every case, but the tendency is intrinsic to a relationship that involves two
animate beings in ways that it is not intrinsic to my relationship to my blood
or kidneys.
It is a commonplace that people create artifacts of many kinds, and they
may find themselves heavily invested in their work. A scholar is seldom indifferent to colleagues' reception of his work; the destruction of a painting in
which the artist has invested - and this investment must go on in any serious human activity - is painful for the artist. In these cases it is clear to us
that a bonding between creator and created is something that we could only
call natural. Why are we reluctant to see the same tendency in pregnancy?
I think the reason may be that pregnancy does not seem to us to be an
action in the same sense that artistic creation is. Pregnancy may seem more
passive, something happening to the self rather than something the self controls. But this perspective reveals a narrowness of vision and a limited conception of the self that we should repudiate. Pregnancy is the most intimate
form of biological interdependence we know of; it involves risk, inconven-
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ience and reciprocity; if it goes to completion, it culminates in a powerful
experience. Throughout, the fact of the existence of two embodied individuals is apparent. I think it sensible to say that a natural bond tends to form.
The problem with the extrinsicalist perspectives and libertarian analogies
is not that they are altogether wrong. Really they have two problems. First,
use of these analogies inevitably suggests that the formation of the natural
bond is more contingent than it is in fact. By implying that people can choose
whether or not to bond, these approaches inevitably suggest that people can
count on kinds of security and control that, in reality, they cannot. They
perpetuate a deadly modem myth. Second, they do get at something true,
namely the possibility of treating our bodies as commodities. This objectifying perspective is not altogether perverse; in fact the liberation it brings is a
profound necessity. The problem, as with the previous analogies, is that this
perspective is insufficient. They obscure some dimensions of surrogating and
of our lives, and they are dimensions of great importance. As we think of
the tendency to self-involvement, another analogy suggests itself.
V
In the column to which I have already referred, Ellen Goodman discusses
the contract that Mary Beth Whitehead signed with Elizabeth and William
Stem. Goodman refers to the "absurd" contract provision "that in the best
interests of the child [Whitehead] will not form or attempt to form a parentchild relationship with the fetus." 1 2 Goodman reports further components
of the contract:
The Whiteheads agreed to assume all risks "including the risk of
[Mary Beth's] death." They agreed that if she miscarried before
the fourth month there would be no payment. If she miscarried
after the fourth, even if the baby was stillborn, she would be paid
only $1,000. She wasn't to be paid for her services, but rather for
the product.
More intrusively, the contract states that Mary Beth promised not
to abort the fetus unless the doctor said it was necessary for her
physical health. Conversely, she also agreed to amniocentesis and
promised if the "test reveals that the fetus is genetically or congenitally abnormal .. .to abort the fetus upon demand of William

Stem." If she refused, his contractual obligations were over.
As a final touch, the contract compelled Whitehead to follow all
the medical instructions of her physician and "not to smoke cigarettes, drink alcoholic beverages ... or... take medications with-

out written consent from her physician." It said nothing about
12. Id.
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childbirth, but presumably those decisions were also up to the doctor and father. In short, she sold her body, put her womb in the
hands of others. 3
Whitehead contracted a relationship in which control over her reproductive processes, indeed over her habits and movements, were surrendered to
another. The fetus' father had rights Whitehead's husband would not have
had if he and Whitehead had engendered a child. That these restrictions are
logical from the perspective of the parents who hope to receive the child is
obvious. However, we have to ask what status they impose upon the surrogate, whose entire life is subordinated to "the delivery of a product" for
another.
A powerful and close analogy in our cultural tradition is slavery. To be
sure, there are disanalogies of great moment: The surrogate's status is not
hereditary, and the bondage period is brief. She assumes the status by a
seemingly free contract and in nine months she is freed. I think that these
disanalogies are very powerful and that they are strongest when the form of
slavery we think of is American black slavery, which was racial, hereditary
and entirely involuntary. But that is not the only form of slavery the world
has known, nor was it the form John Stuart Mill had in mind when he argued against the legitimacy of persons selling themselves into slavery. Indeed, we might bring the prostitution analogy back for discussion if we
remember that prostitution was sometimes called "white slavery."
There are two intuitive points of contact. One is that control over progeny, the ability to separate parents and children, has always been thought to
be among the most repugnant features of slavery, including American black
slavery. Totalitarian control is ratcheted to a new height when, going beyond
depriving me of my freedom, it deprives me of my offspring. That is to say, a
freedom lost in surrogating and in slavery is widely perceived to be important, touching an intimate side of the soul.
Secondly, it is in no way clear that the bondage will necessarily be limited
to nine months duration; to be sure, it may be. Some women may be able to
avoid personal involvement with a baby they bear, although I confess to
amazement at the claim that someone "knows" she can avoid becoming involved. Should bonding occur, as I have claimed it tends to do, then the
surrogate has put herself in the position of selling the "part" of herself that
is bonded to the child. Even if no bonding occurs, the surrogate has surrendered control over her life for nine months in ways that are unique and often
considered incompatible with the dignity of free persons.
In fact I have already made some claims that seem inconsistent with this
13. Id.
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judgment, for I have celebrated the extent to which persons are not in control of themselves in pregnancy. Indeed, true human selfhood is discovered
through acknowledgment of some relations that are constitutive of the self.
Some of these relations, such as marriage or vocation, are not so obviously
biological as pregnancy and I freely concede that some non-lineal social relations, including adoptive parenthood, are rightly understood to create conditions that require the sacrifice of independence.
Thus it is not exactly the loss of "autonomy" that is problematic in surrogating because selves are fulfilled in social relations that inevitably involve
the loss of independence. But surrogating is like slavery in the absence of
reciprocity, in the fact that one person becomes what Aristotle called an
"animated tool" of another, serving simply as a means to another's ends.
Thus most modem people believe that the fact that a marriage makes someone miserable is a relevant reason for divorce as the marital relation is understood to be reciprocal, but the surrogate's unhappiness - from a strict
contractual view - is irrelevant to the validity of the contract. The fact,
widely reported in the media, that some surrogates find the arrangement
fulfilling, is entirely irrelevant; some slaves may have relished their lot. The
issue is what sort of constraints on freedom are compatible with life in a just
community. The practice of surrogating inevitably places people in a position where they may find they have committed themselves to allowing part
of themselves to be used for another's purposes and this may be wrong for
essentially the same reasons as slavery.
In using this strong term, I do not mean to retract my earlier observation
that renunciation of a child may be a moral act of the highest order. In the
conclusion, I shall return to that possibility. But I have tried to suggest that
surrogating may involve a very different kind of relation, one that is likely to
be exploitive. Indeed, when the woman's exact relation to the gift cannot be
determined in advance, the prior contract itself prevents the transfer from
being a gift and converts it to commerce in human selfhood.
VI
The analogy with slavery is deliberately provocative, meant to call attention to problems with those analogies that stress the importance of self-determination. If who or what the self is were clear, those analogies would be
much stronger, but because embodiedness is inescapable and relational ties
are not always under our own control, the analogies break down. Ulysses
could lash himself to the mast, binding himself in an act of freedom. A surrogate may be able similarly to guarantee her own commitment to indepen-
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dence, but in the nature of the case, it's harder. The likelihood of civil war
within the self is significant.
Of course, there is a further disanalogy with Ulysses, glossed over by
users of the libertarian analogies. Margot Hornblower,"4 writing in the
Washington Post, sketched a profile of a typical surrogate: She is poor; she is
not well-educated. In contrast, the beneficiaries of surrogating are typically
middle-class professionals who are well-educated and in good shape financially. The contrasts between the Stems and the Whiteheads are not atypical. Clearly, we are not dealing with bargains between equals.
Some would argue that contracts between partners of such differing degrees of economic power are necessarily exploitive, claiming that the poor
have no real freedom. I resist that claim in its strongest form. Moreover, the
desire to have a child can become so strong that the purchasers of a surrogate's services are surely more to be pitied than censured. There is certainly
weakness and despair on the purchaser's side of the contract, and attempts
to improve one's lot through initiative and industry are praiseworthy. A
strident contrast between the saintly, poor exploited surrogate and the careless, career oriented purchaser is terribly cruel and oversimple.
Still, the pattern remains troubling. If surrogating is such a great thing,
why don't more middle-class women line up to do it for their friends? The
comparative profiles make it appear that a choice to surrogate is often an act
of desperation, a risk of the self in order to find meaning or money when
other alternatives have been exhausted. Given the paucity of published data
on income levels and occupations of surrogates and their clients, it is hard to
draw any firm conclusions. But we should be suspicious of arguments that
these exchanges are required by freedom, if in fact the transactions show a
consistent pattern of benefitting the American professional class.
The justice of surrogating arrangements affects another dimension of the
libertarian analogies besides the economic. Some discussions of the custody
of surrogated children have developed an analogy with child abuse. Noting
that the state may remove an endangered child from the custody of its parents, they claim that, similarly, it is appropriate for the courts to decide the
child's fate in a custody war involving a child born through surrogating. In
both cases, the best interest of the child should triumph. Insofar as it may be
predicted, it appears likely that surrogates will regularly lose when this standard is applied, for the advantages of money and position are significant
ceteris paribus.
The trouble is that child abuse statutes are designed precisely for situa14. Homblower, Baby M. Battle of Class and Gender, Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 1987, at AI,
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tions of abuse and are a most imperfect "fit." A surrogate situation may be
more like a custody battle in a divorce court. Even here, a disanalogy arises,
for surrogate and client have never committed to sharing a life and the surrogate has already run the risk of alienation of self for the donor. Under
these circumstances, it seems inappropriate simply to apply a "best interest"
standard to the child, as there are few parents who are not distinctly inferior
to an alternative. We should not take the contract so seriously that we acknowledge equal claims on the part of surrogate and client. It's one thing to
say she has to give back the money; it's another to add insult to injury by
getting into a "Sophie's Choice" of adjudicating between the relative fitness
of surrogate and client.
VII
At the outset, I claimed that I wanted to be interrogative and I called for
patience rather than dogmatic assertion. As the argument has developed it
may seem that this statement was an act of bad faith - or at best dissembling. For it must be clear that I have deep reservations about the practice of surrogating. But the issues are of such moment that thoughtful
persons will differ. When the uncertainties involve the relation of self and
body, of selves to each other, and of the limits - if any - of human sovereignty, who could expect anything else?
In conclusion I want to repeat my conviction that surrogating can be an
act of great love. "Greater love hath no man than this, that he lay down his
life for his friends"'" is rightly treated as a description of moral heroism.
The giving over of a child may be sanctifying. Our policy should not preclude this option through legislation that outlaws surrogating.
Since the relationship of surrogate and donor is laden with the possibility
of abuse, we should do two things. First, we should make it clear that surrogating contracts will not be enforced in the courts and that those contracts
are irrelevant to any custody battles that may ensue. Second, when a surrogate defends her right to keep a child, we should measure her fitness as a
mother against some threshold standard of adequacy rather than vis-a-vis
the ability of the alternative (donor) claimant. If these principles are followed we will see a decrease in commercial surrogating, for we will create a
situation in which caveat emptor is the rule. The possibility of exceptional
self-giving will remain, but the incentive for a practice that would inevitably
exploit some for the sake of others will be minimized.

15. John 15:13 (King James).

